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ABSTRACT:  This article discusses the possibility of dealing, from a scientific point of view, 
with ethical standards from which one can critically evaluate positive law. For a long time it was 
considered that such standards would be subjective, emotional, and that they would vary 
according to time and place. That is why it was considered impossible, especially from a positivist 
point of view, to examine them using a scientific approach, due to a lack of the necessary 
objectivity. The findings of contemporary biology and neuroscience, however, may cast new light on 
this debate. Although they would not resolve the debate, these findings significantly challenge the 
idea that moral sentiments  cannot be able to be scientifically studied. 
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 For a long time the traditional opinion was that scientific knowledge could 
only explain objective realities. This idea may still explain the common sense 
understanding and the collective imaginary’s perceptions of the scientist’s 
stereotype. Even without further discussing this view of science, what matters is 
that it has influenced legal academia with the claim that “natural law” should 
not be considered as a serious research field. Indeed, “natural law” supposedly 
has several attributes which make it incompatible with typical “scientific” 
analysis, such as: subjectivity, an emotional nature, no possibility of empirical 
demonstration etc. Ethical, moral and natural law are perhaps the subject 
matter of a philosophical approach, but should never be considered in a 
scientific Theory of Law. The word “perhaps” has been used in the previous 
sentence because we know that even philosophy has been threatened by 
positivism. The latter intended to replace the Philosophy of Law with a General 
Theory of Law, which equally has universal aspirations but does not study 
metaphysical issues1. 
 This paper aims to readdress that old problem. The aim is not so much to 
question the view of scientific knowledge mentioned in the last paragraph, 
which will be briefly discussed, but rather, the aim is to examine the manner in 
which the current state of the art of neuroscience and evolutionary biology calls 
into question the idea that “natural law” cannot be scientifically studied, while 
still maintaining the positivist epistemological paradigm. In addition to 
reporting how a few findings in those areas provide a scientific account of 
moral sentiments and their reflections in the context of human societies, we 
intend to critically examine how those findings can contribute to a proper 
understanding of the law. In the last part of the article, we will approach 
possible contributions of neuroscience and biology to the Philosophy of Law 
by joining, albeit briefly, the debate about how science has allegedly become 
superior to philosophy, in order to find out if the distance between the two 
disciplines becomes even greater, when consideration is given to the advances 
in science, revealing the secrets of the human brain. 
1. Natural law’s lack of  scientificity under the positivist 
paradigm 
 This article does not aim to examine the history of positivism and its branches 
or divisions within Legal Theory2. Perhaps it should suffice to know that, from a 
positivist perspective of science, which claims that scientific knowledge is 
descriptive and objective, science can only examine issues which  can be logically 
or empirically verifiable. Everything that does not fit that description would be 
considered metaphysical, emotional and subjective. As we know, this is the main 
reason why the positivist approach of Law refuses to examine issues related to 
natural justice or the so-called “natural law”. Modern scientists must accept “reality 
as it is, trying to understand it based on a purely experimental conception”3, which 
                    ___________________________ 
1 RADBRUCH, Gustav. Filosofia do Direito. Tradução de Cabral de Moncada. (Coimbra: Armenio 
Amado, 1997) 73. 
2 For more on this topic, see v.g., BOBBIO, Norberto. O positivismo jurídico. Tradução e notas de 
Marcio Pugliesi, Edison Bini e Carlos E. Rodrigues. (São Paulo: Icone, 1995). 
3 BOBBIO, Norberto. O positivismo jurídico. tradução e notas de Marcio Pugliesi, Edison Bini e 
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is why one may review norms, regulations, judicial decisions, behaviors, social facts 
but never values based on which such realities could be judged. 
An important pillar of this world view lies in the distinction between fact-based 
judgments and value judgments  as well as the logical impossibility of extracting 
the latter from the former,  based on David Hume’s classical allusion to the 
“naturalistic fallacy”, also known as the is-ought problem4. Through fact-based 
judgments, which are “objective”, one can describe reality as it is. Through value 
judgments one may decide whether reality is good or bad based on the ideal notion 
of how reality should be. Scientific knowledge would consist of the first type of 
judgment,   avoiding the latter at all costs. After all, science is based on experience, 
on empirical observation, and “experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but 
not that it cannot be otherwise”5.  This is why legal positivism proposes that legal 
scientists should only describe the law as it is, paying no regard to how it should or 
could be. While there are, of course, disagreements about what should be 
considered as such, whether it should be legislative acts or norms, standards, 
practices of judges, or the response of society to these standards.   Nevertheless, all 
these different views converge on one point: all those possible objects are 
“objective”; they can be submitted to “objective” analysis. Scientists are interested 
in the validity rather than the value of a legal order. 
I should clarify, however, that this article is not defending that view of natural 
law or natural law theories. Neither is it defending such a view of Science. We 
know there are authors who defend contemporary forms of natural law which do 
not fit the aforementioned stereotype. Dworkin6 and John Finnis7 are examples of 
thinkers who hold this view. In fact, the aim of this discussion is to revisit the view 
of natural law built by its main positivist detractors, despite the fact that it may 
suffer the so-called “Straw Man fallacy”, according to which one builds a 
caricatured version of the idea under objection, in order to make it easier to 
criticize it. The purpose of this analysis is to show that even this caricatured 
“Natural Law” deserves to be revisited or reanalyzed due to a number of 
discoveries in biology and neuroscience. 
2. Possible objections to this paradigm 
 The view of legal science discussed above raises a number of criticisms and 
objections. First, even someone who accepts that idea of science can question its 
sufficiency and support the need to complement its approach with other methods 
of inquiry, such as Philosophy for instance. The deepest objection, however, may 
be one that affects the very epistemological assumptions of the positivism 
paradigm. 
Indeed, as a matter of fact, scientific knowledge is not only made by 
disinterested observations, and the scientist is not someone who merely describes 
an objective reality. The scientific process is value-oriented from the very moment 
when the object to be studied is chosen and identified. Otherwise, one would be 
able to find scholars dedicating their time to counting the exact number of grains 
                    ___________________________ 
4 HUME, David. Tratado da natureza humana. 2.ed. Tradução de Déborah Danowski. (São Paulo: 
Unesp, 2000), Book 3, Part 1, Section 1, § 27, p. 509. 
5 KANT, Immanuel. Critique of pure reason. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 137. 
6 DWORKIN, Ronald. ‘Natural law’ revisited. University of Florida law review, (Florida, v. XXXIV, 
n.2, p. 165-188, winter of 1982). 
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of sand on a certain beach, or counting the number of bathroom tiles in the 
University where they teach. This would be as common as seeing researchers 
trying to find ways to stop the growth of malignant tumor, for example, or trying 
to understand the causes of urban violence or poverty. 
In fact, knowledge develops from identifying problems and testing possible 
solutions to those problems. This occurs even in the most primitive life forms. 
Interactions with the environment are inherent to any system, and there is no 
interaction without information. In other words, in order to be understood as such 
and to interact with its immediate environment, a system requires information 
about itself, its environment and how to react to it. For example, living things need 
to know the temperature of the surrounding environment and how appropriate or 
inappropriate it is in order to escape from the extreme heat that could damage 
their molecular structure and therefore their livelihood. Consequently, the first 
problem that gives rise to knowledge is survival. To solve this problem, natural 
selection finds a wide range of solutions in a trial and error process. 
 Evidently, the word “knowledge” can be used in a broader sense, as in the 
previous paragraph, to refer to situations in which there is not necessarily any 
awareness or conscientiousness. In this sense, bacteria “know” how to get food, 
digest it, generate energy, reproduce etc. even though, as single-cell organisms, 
they obviously lack consciousness. However, even without consciousness there is 
information, some of it already stored inside living beings and some of it obtained 
from their interactions with the environment. That information and the way it is 
handled are stored in the genetic code of each living being8, where knowledge 
about an organism’s formation and operation has been recorded for over millions 
of generations. Living beings favored with the best information have increased 
their chances of survival and reproduction. Over millions of years, a substantial 
amount of data (how to make, maintain and regenerate cells, tissues, organs, 
systems, etc.) is therefore selected, refined and stored in the DNA of every living 
being. 
In contrast, one could argue that this is not the kind of knowledge that people 
talk about when dealing with Science. This objection, however, is unfounded since 
human knowledge does not develop so differently. In fact, knowledge can be 
understood more narrowly as a relationship established between a subject who 
knows and an object that is known and under which the subject builds an image of 
that object; but knowledge can also be understood as the unfinished product of 
this relationship. In any case, one cannot deny that it unfolds in similar terms to 
those observed in the process of the natural selection, of which it is ultimately a 
product of9. 
Indeed, the human brain has an understanding of the world around it, built on 
information that is collected by imperfect senses – imperfect, or just good enough 
to allow survival10. This information is interpreted based on prior-knowledge that 
come from past experiences of the same individual or its ancestors11. The brain’s 
understanding of the reality around it is imperfect and, as such, temporary, subject 
                    ___________________________ 
8 AFTALIÓN, Enrique R.; VILANOVA, José; RAFFO, Julio. Introducción al derecho. (Buenos Aires: 
Abeledo-Perrot, 2004), 41-47. 
9 RIDLEY, Matt. The rational optimist: how prosperity evolves. (New York: Harper Collins, 2010), 5. 
10 NICOLELIS, Miguel. Muito além do nosso eu. (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2011), 452. 
11 POPPER, Karl. O mito do contexto: em defesa da ciência e da racionalidade. Tradução de Paula Taipas. 
(Lisboa: Edições 70, 2009), 108; NOZICK, Robert. Invariances. The structure of the objective world. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 108; GAZZANIGA, Michael S. Who’s in charge? Free 
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to a constant process of confirmation or correction. Human beings are aware that 
eventually their senses can be deceiving about their immediate physical reality, but 
those same senses are the only possible access to that reality. Therefore, they must 
submit the impressions obtained from their senses to constant examination12. 
Thus, neuroscience has somehow confirmed claims made long before by 
hermeneutics theorists such as Husserl and Gadamer, for example. 
With the emergence of the so called mirror neurons throughout the 
evolutionary process, neurons that allow an individual to put himself or herself in 
someone else’s shoes, seeing that other people are like him or her and wondering, 
within this context, what he or she might be feeling, ideas such as empathy, moral 
feelings and language have also emerged, and those ideas are essential to human 
knowledge13. Naturally, a more complex neurological system also evolved together 
with mirror neurons14, so we cannot say that mirror neurons alone are responsible 
to all human superior capabilities15. Anyway, with language and the capability to 
create institutional realities, individuals were able to apply the same logic of natural 
selection to ideas. Instead of disappearing, living beings who have recorded an 
inadequate way to solve a problem in their DNA could observe - or hear, or read - 
another being that had found a more appropriate way to solve the same problem 
and learn how to do the same. This is the reason why I said before that human 
knowledge is a direct product of natural selection, somehow reflecting it. 
In one way or another, this shows that problems are identified first and 
solutions proposed afterwards, modeled on the individual’s preconceptions of 
those problems and possible ways of resolving them. Such preconceptions can 
result from past experiences of their ancestors and become reflected in DNA, thus 
forming instincts that give individuals a prior record of how to react in such 
situations16. Nonetheless, they can also result from past experiences of the same 
individual, which are kept in his memory. In any case, whether arising from 
instincts, from past experiences of the same individual or from observation of 
third-party experiences, those proposals are tested and the best options are 
selected. There is no definitive solution; it is always possible to come up with a 
different, more appropriate or efficient one. 
This, as we know, is the basis of Karl Popper’s epistemology of fallibilism17. It 
is also how the process of natural selection unfolds and how human cognition 
occurs in general. There is no reason to understand that scientific knowledge is 
processed in a radically different way. Despite its being more concerned with 
systematicity, it is nonetheless a species of the genus human cognition. 
On the other hand, we know that the reality is more complex than our human 
capacity to understand it. Therefore, the brain simplifies it by eliminating or 
                    ___________________________ 
12 RESCHER, Nicholas. Epistemology - An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2003), 83. 
13 RAMACHANDRAN, V. S., The tell-tale brain: a neuroscientist´s quest for what makes us human. (New 
York: WW. Norton & Co. 2011), 117. 
14 LIEBERMAN, Matthew D. Social. Why our brains are wired to connect. (Oxford University Press, 
ibooks, 2013). 
15 Especially because, it is important to remember, mirror neurons were initially found in macaques, 
not in humans, so they cannot be the unique explanation for all human capabilities. Cf. HICKOK, 
Gregory. The mith of mirror neurons. The real neuroscience of communication and cognition. (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2014). 
16 GAZZANIGA, Michael S. Who’s in charge? Free will and the Science of the brain. (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2011), 51. 
17 POPPER, Karl. A vida é aprendizagem – Epistemologia evolutiva e sociedade aberta. Tradução de Paula 
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disregarding some of its parts which are considered irrelevant for the main 
purpose of understanding. Consequently, someone wishing “only to describe” a 
portion of reality should, based on the reasons for that “mere description”, 
chooses which aspects will be highlighted and which are going to be ignored. And 
there is more: they must establish the boundaries between the object being 
described and the remaining parts of reality, once again taking into account the 
main purpose of the description. For instance, if someone wants to “describe” the 
distance between Fortaleza and Recife (two cities in Northeastern Brazil), a few 
meters or even kilometers will certainly be disregarded if the purpose of the 
description is to calculate the time it takes to fly from one city to the other. 
However, if description pertains to an individual’s height so that he or she can buy 
clothes, this requires greater accuracy, although centimeters or even millimeters 
can be disregarded18. Those millimeters are going to be essential, however, if the 
description is made by a student who wishes to borrow some graphite leads for his 
or her mechanical pencil, they need to be clear about whether they need a 0.5 or 
0.7 lead. 
Thus, even if one understands the  process of scientific inquiry as being “merely 
descriptive” of reality “as it is”, one would have to admit that values guide the 
choice of what will be described and the determination of aspects to be taken into 
account in this activity. That description consists of having reality “reconstructed” 
by whoever is studying it. The purpose is to confirm or rectify a previous 
construction about that very same notoriously imperfect reality. Therefore, one 
cannot categorically refrain from considering values, even when referring to 
“descriptive” science, because the very notion that values must be removed from a 
scientist’s work is itself markedly guided by values and is, as such, contradictory. 
In light of the above, we can make the following conclusions, which defeat the 
epistemological foundations of a positivist view of science: (i) reality is not “merely 
described” by the one studying it; it is in fact rebuilt by him or her through 
imperfect senses, which provide information to the brain that is to be interpreted 
based on existing preconceptions ; (ii) when describing reality, researchers choose 
which parts of it are going to be considered and which are going to be disregarded; 
(iii) precisely because knowledge is made from imperfect reconstructions of reality, 
it is essentially temporary and rectifiable. 
Most notably, however, even for those who insist on holding on to the 
positivist epistemological paradigm, eventually finding solid reasons to overcome 
each of those objections19, it is difficult to support the thesis proposing that fact-
based judgments and value judgments (is and ought distinction) are subject to 
detached separation, and that moral sentiments are entirely emotional and 
subjective and, as such, are incompatible with purely descriptive scientific analysis. 
The problem in this case arises from the latest discoveries in Biology and 
Neuroscience, an issue we will examine in the next section of this paper. 
3. Biology, neuroscience and moral sentiments 
 Contemporary biology has conclusively revealed that natural selection is not 
necessarily related to selfish behavior. Darwin had already made that statement; 
                    ___________________________ 
18 DEEMTER, Kees Van. Not exactly: In praise of vagueness. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
81. 
19 see MACHADO SEGUNDO, Hugo de Brito. Epistemologia falibilista e Teoria do Direito. 
Revista do Instituto do Direito Brasileiro da Universidade de Lisboa – RIDB Ano 3 (2014), n.º 1, p. 197-260, 
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however in the late 20th century, studies about primates empirically verified basic 
elements of political institutions and moral sentiments, especially in higher 
mammals20. When Richard Dawkins, for instance, metaphorically alludes to a 
“selfish gene”21, he discusses the actions of something that is a component of the 
DNA inside living cells, something that cannot, for obvious reasons, have 
motivations – whether selfish or not – for its “actions”. Nevertheless, such actions 
may allow the selection of individuals equipped with neural systems that allow the 
emergence of genuinely selfless actions and behaviors22. 
As a matter of fact, relationships among living beings in the struggle for 
survival involve what in game theory is known as the “non-zero sum game”. “Zero 
sum” games are those in which a participant scores points and the other loses the 
same amount, so that the sum of the overall scores is always zero. On the other 
hand, games known as “non-zero sum” involve the possibility of one of the 
participants earning points without implying prejudice, disadvantage or harm to 
others. This is the case of survival, because one living being’s survival, 
nourishment or reproduction does not require all other living organisms to fail in 
those same tasks. Hence the emergence of cooperation, which is natural in “non-zero 
sum” games23. 
While cooperative behaviors favor the survival of a group of individuals who 
adopt them, such behaviors are naturally selected even among organisms that have 
no consciousness, such as insects or bacteria24. Nonetheless, it is precisely because 
those cooperative behaviors enable the survival of groups of individuals who 
adopt them that they lead to the natural selection of neurological and sensory 
systems that, among other functions, are able to enhance that cooperation, making 
it more efficient and complex. That is the basis, for instance, of animal protection 
instincts toward their offspring, which lead to the preservation of individuals with 
similar genetic codes. It is also the basis for the very emergence of an even more 
complex neurological system in higher mammals such as chimpanzees, bonobos, 
dolphins and wolves, which are capable of providing moral sentiments that enable 
community living25. 
It seems clear, indeed, that living in a community is less difficult than living in 
isolation, and the convenience of living in groups will be more favorable as 
cooperation between members of that group grows. Moreover, one individual 
from “outside” the group can join it to destroy its members, or even one of the 
previous members can stop cooperating with others (free rider). For this reason, 
mechanisms that allow for the recognition of individuals who cooperate or do not 
cooperate have been naturally selected. The same mechanism enables individuals 
to remember previous interactions and the behavior that other members of the 
group adopted then. Remembering and recognizing is not enough, though, 
because in large groups a single individual can interact once with another 
individual who does not cooperate and that he will never meet again. As a solution 
                    ___________________________ 
20 WAAL, Frans de. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 2013 
21 DAWKINS, Richard. The selfish gene. 2.ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
22 WAAL, Frans de. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 117. 
23 AXELROD, Robert. A evolução da cooperação. Tradução de Jusella Santos. (São Paulo: Leopardo, 
2010). 
24 AXELROD, Robert. A evolução da cooperação. Tradução de Jusella Santos. (São Paulo: Leopardo, 
2010), 19; GREENE, 2013, p. 57-58 
25 WAAL, Frans de. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. 
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to this problem, individuals have moral sentiments in order to approve or 
disapprove the conduct of others, no matter if they have interacted before or just 
witnessed (or heard about) a previous interaction with somebody else. Because of 
this, reputation and trust emerge as very important values in the community26. 
Just as a nutritious food brings pleasure, and spoiled or poisoned food can 
cause sickness or disgust due to the natural selection process, behaviors that 
positively enable a group’s cohesion and harmony produce pleasurable sensations 
in individuals who witness or adopt them, leading such behavior to be appreciated 
and encouraged. And actions that lead to the opposite result, that is, to 
disharmony and tension in the group, produce negative feelings that lead others to 
inhibit or censor those actions. This is the reason for stating that moral feelings 
originate in natural selection, a subject in which we have relative agreement among 
biologists today27. 
 Franz de Waal28, by the way, says that, reading books like A Theory of Justice29,an 
influential book by the contemporary philosopher John Rawls, I cannot escape the 
feeling that rather than describing human innovation, it elaborates on ancient 
themes, many of which are recognizable in our nearest relatives. Of course, 
everything is more explicit in human society because of our ability to formulate 
rules of conduct, discuss them among ourselves, and write about them in exquisite 
detail. Still, it is safe to assume that the actions of our ancestors were guided by 
gratitude, obligation, retribution, and indignation long before they developed 
enough language capacity for moral discourse. 
According to those ideas, authors such as Joshua Greene30 use those biological 
concepts as a foundation for revisiting known moral issues such as those related to 
the trolley problem, the well-known experiment used by moral philosophy 
scholars31. The trolley problem can be described succinctly as follows: a runaway 
trolley runs along rail tracks. There are five workers on the rail tracks right ahead. 
The trolley can be diverted to a different track, where only one worker is stood . 
Would it be morally right to turn the trolley to the alternative track and kill one 
person in order to save five? A positive response in this case is quite often: yes, it 
would be correct to change the course of the trolley to save five people, even if it 
causes one death. A few changes in the experiment can make things more difficult 
and slightly different. In one of such instances, is a scenario in which; instead of an 
alternative track, there is a very fat man on a bridge above the rails, and the 
question is whether it is fair to push this man onto the rails so he can hit the trolley 
and stop it, saving the five people at the end of the track. This time, however, 
most people do not approve of pushing and killing the fat man, even if it leads to 
                    ___________________________ 
26 PINKER, Steven. Como a mente funciona. Tradução de Laura Teixeira Motta. (São Paulo: 
Companhia das Letras, 1998); AXELROD, Robert. A evolução da cooperação. Tradução de Jusella 
Santos. (São Paulo: Leopardo, 2010), 14; WAAL, Frans de. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and 
Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 113; GREENE, 
Joshua. Moral Tribes. (New York: Penguin, 2013), 112. 
27 RUSE, Michael. Evolutionary ethics: a phoenix arisen. (Zygon, v. 21, n. 1, 1986), 95-112; 
HAUSER, Marc. Moral minds. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006); WAAL, Frans de. The bonobo and 
the atheist. (New York: W. W. Norton & co., 2013); DAWKINS, Richard. The selfish gene. 2.ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989); DAWKINS, Richard. The god delusion. (London: Bantam 
Press, 2006). 
28 WAAL, Frans de. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 161. 
29 RAWLS, John. A theory of justice. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
30 GREENE, Joshua. Moral Tribes. (New York: Penguin, 2013). 
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saving five people at the at the expense of a single life, just as in the first form of 
the experiment. 
There is extensive literature concerning philosophical discussions around this 
issue, investigating the distinctions between the two situations and their reflections 
on the study of utilitarian theories, as Kantian and many others. Dawkins32 and 
Hauser33, for example, see the disgust in pushing the fat guy, even to save five 
lives, as a reflection of the Kantian categorical imperative, because the problem is 
using the man as a thing or as a mere means to an end, equating it to a stone. In 
the situation where the trolley is shifted to an alternative track, the guy who dies at 
the end of the alternate route is not used as a means to an end, and his death is just 
an unwanted negative side effect. Incidentally, if the worker was not at the end of 
the rail, the detour could be done in just the same way, saving the very same five 
workers. 
Joshua Greene34, however, uses the notions of biology that we already 
mentioned, combined with discoveries from neuroscience and brain imaging 
which assess in real time the brain function of people undergoing the above trolley 
problem experiment. He then tries to answer those questions in a less speculative 
and more empirically-grounded fashion, investigating why in some cases an action 
that leads to the death of one person to save five lives seems correct while it seems 
wrong in other cases, even though  people often cannot give good reasons to 
support their choice. People feel, firstly, that an action is right or wrong and then 
try to find or create reasons to justify their choice. Greene does not believe that 
the explanation is simply the innate character of something such as Kant’s 
categorical imperative, and so he proceeds to making some changes to the 
experiment. Let us suppose that the alternative track where the worker stands 
alone is not a “dead end”, but in fact it takes the trolley back to the main track 
where there are the five workers who must be saved. In this case, the absence of 
that lone worker would make the diversion ineffective: the trolley will return to the 
main track and kill all five workers. So, with this change in the thought experiment, 
the lone worker in the alternative track is like an obstacle, such as a stone or the fat 
man being pushed onto rails from a bridge. In fact, he will be a mere tool to 
prevent the trolley from returning and killing the other five.  Nevertheless, even if 
they do not clearly know why, many people choose to change the trolley’s path, or 
at least they think that this detour appears to be less unpleasant than pushing the 
fat man onto the rails, even if it aims to achieve the same purpose of killing one to 
save five. 
For Greene, what actually occurs is that we have been biologically selected to 
have a certain level of repulsion for actions that have violence as an immediate 
end, such as pushing someone to death, but we do not have the same perception 
of acts in which the death of someone appears as a remote or indirect end, and not 
as the most immediate goal. 
Within this context, we can start a rich and important discussion about 
conscious and unconscious forms of human reactions to moral questions, which 
Greene35 studies based on the ideas of Daniel Kahneman36 regarding two forms of 
human behavior, which he named “automatic” and “manual”. Automatic behavior 
is mainly intuitive and, to some extent, instinctive. It is fast and efficient at solving 
                    ___________________________ 
32 DAWKINS, Richard. The god delusion. (London: Bantam Press, 2006), 214. 
33 HAUSER, Marc. Moral minds. (New York: Harper Collins, 2006). 
34 GREENE, Joshua. Moral Tribes. (New York: Penguin, 2013). 
35 GREENE, Joshua. Moral Tribes. (New York: Penguin, 2013), 320. 
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problems that are similar to the ones that led to its formation. That behavior can 
be generated by natural selection from the unconscious behaviors of ancestors, or 
by unconscious memories of past experiences of the same individual. For this 
reason, however, the “automatic mode” is unable to deal with new and unusual 
situations37. On the other hand, manual behavior, which is known as conscious or 
rational, is slower and it involves greater cognitive effort. Meanwhile, it is flexible 
and can handle new situations. A sample of those two types of action can be seen 
when someone is trying to learn how to drive. In the beginning, this person must 
pay a lot of (conscious) attention to actions such as shifting gears or pressing 
pedals; however, after some practice, the subject simply drives while only focusing 
on where he is going, without consciously thinking about which gear he has to 
shift to or what pedals are supposed to be pressed. 
Shaped by millions of years of natural selection, in their “automatic mode” 
human beings have mechanisms that push them to collaborate with people that 
they view as being from their own group. For this reason, in the relationship 
between an individual and his peers and in a “Me versus us” conflict, feelings of 
cooperation will allow for situations where the former does not always prevail 
upon the latter. This is why sometimes people act in a genuine and disinterested 
form of altruism, or why they experience some satisfaction witnessing such 
actions, even when whoever benefits from them is someone to whom they are not 
related or from whom nothing is expected in return38. That is regarded today as the 
origin of moral sentiments. 
The problem is that those mechanisms fail or do not work well when the 
“other” with whom the individual is supposed to cooperate is seen as someone 
from outside his or her group. This creates conflict, not between “Me vs. us” but 
rather between “Us x Them”. In this case, such mechanisms from which moral 
sentiments arise do not promote the same selflessness. Instead, they generate a 
sense of competition and very often, rivalry and destruction. In other words, 
evolution has selected cooperative behaviors and feelings that favor intragroup but 
not intergroup relationships. This is reflected, for example, in religions that often 
preach altruistic behaviors in relation to one’s “fellow creatures”, a concept that is 
not generally remembered by many believers in regard to those who profess 
different religions. 
Joshua Greene argues that in such situations it is convenient to adopt the same 
solution used by the brain in cases of conflict between two of its automatic 
mechanisms which lead to divergent results: deploying the manual mode. For 
example, when the name of a color is printed in a different color (e.g., the word 
“red” written in blue color), and someone asks us to quickly   read the word, part 
of our automatic functioning brain compels us to pronounce the name of the color 
of the letters forming the word (“blue”), but in response another part indicates the 
meaning of those letters grouped together (“red”). When given two divergent 
behaviors suggested by our intuitive system, the “manual” mode takes over and 
consciously (with greater effort and more slowly) verifies what response is 
consistent with the question, choosing the answer that corresponds to the meaning 
of the letters and not the color in which they are printed. 
Just as the “manual mode” is used when there are divergent solutions provided 
                    ___________________________ 
37 To read more about instinct and its rigidity, see MIRANDA, Pontes de. O Problema Fundamental 
do Conhecimento. (Porto Alegre: O Globo, 1937), 19; GREENE, Joshua. Moral Tribes. (New York: 
Penguin, 2013), 341. 
38 WAAL, Frans de. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. 
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by different sections of the same brain which are operating under the “automatic 
mode”, a situation that Greene calls intracranial conflict of intuitive solutions, he 
suggests that this can also be done in the case of intercranial conflicts, i.e., conflicts 
between solutions presented by automatic or intuitive modes of different people39. 
When the “automatic mode” of the people involved in a moral issue is not able to 
provide convergent solutions to a moral conflict because they do not see each 
other as belonging to the “same group” (e.g., Brazilian x Saudi Arab culture 
regarding women's rights), there would be a case for activating the manual mode, 
and finding the most appropriate solution in a conscious and rational way. 
The obvious problem that can arise in this case  regards how to   determine 
which is the “best rational solution”. In other words, what could be used as 
metacriteria to judge various moral systems which “naturally” emerge in each 
society? This is, indeed, the great question for Moral Philosophy and the Theory of 
Human Rights today, which shows that those Biological  and Neuroscience 
findings are far from making philosophical discussions a thing of the past40. After 
all, why should some of our moral sentiments, shaped by natural selection, be 
encouraged while others  are inhibited or avoided? What criteria should be used to  
select one over the other? 
According to Greene, the solution in this case should be one obtained through 
utilitarian reasoning. After all, rationally the best solution in case of a moral 
conflict is that which promotes the greatest happiness to the greatest number of 
people. In summary, for “easy” questions which do not involve moral conflicts,  
disagreements or disputes  due to opposing arguments, we can rely on automatic 
modes and  moral sentiments, which represent a better way  in accordance with 
natural selection to generate cohesive and cooperative groups. However, in cases 
of dispute between opposing moral positions, when the people involved in the 
issue have radically different views on how to resolve it (resulting, in most cases, 
from the fact that they see others as  being “different” and not from “the same 
group”), the manual mode should be employed and, in Greene’s view, people 
should advocate an utilitarian answer to the problem, adopting the solution that 
maximizes the happiness of the greatest number of people. 
4. Consequences for the contemporary study of  Law 
 While conducting trans-disciplinary studies, usually under the label of 
“neuroscience”, biologists, neurologists, psychologists and even artificial 
intelligence theorists have arrived at undoubtedly disturbing conclusions, which are 
also capable of revolutionizing the way ethical issues are studied. 
Ethical issues, however, do not have to be solved exclusively by biologists or 
neurologists, considering neuroscience findings. As a matter of fact, an additional 
significant revelation of neuroscience is related to its own development: a new 
branch of knowledge stemmed from interaction between specialists from different 
fields, who started to communicate on the intersection points between their fields, 
allowing for progress far beyond the boundaries of their own specialties. A single 
person cannot engage in an in depth study  of all subjects, but this is not a reason 
for a researcher to ignore what others are investigating, researching and 
discovering in other areas. Just as cognition and even artificial intelligence 
theorists41 can interact with neurologists, the same may be equally true for legal 
                    ___________________________ 
39 GREENE, Joshua. Moral Tribes. (New York: Penguin, 2013), 693. 
40 CORTINA, Adela. Neuroética y neuropolítica. Sugerencias para la educación moral. (Madrid: 
Technos, 2011). 
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scientists, legal scholars and legal philosophers. 
One may indeed object to Greene’s ideas and those of other biologists or 
neuroscientists who address those topics, as briefly summarized in the previous 
section, especially with respect to non-specific biological conclusions they may 
reach. For example, despite of Greene’s fairly competent defense of utilitarian 
moral philosophy, his ideas can be subject to some improvement. One can also 
derive a few more practical and immediate conclusions for the study of Law. 
Since each person’s view of what constitutes happiness differs, along with the 
means or elements that lead to happiness; it is perhaps more appropriate to replace 
the maximization of happiness, proposed by Greene, with the maximization of 
freedoms. This is what is done by Amartya Sen, another competent critic of 
utilitarianism42. After all, with freedom, people can decide what happiness means 
and what the best way to pursue it is, achieving the utilitarian ideal in a more 
efficient way. 
On the other hand, although neuroscience reinforces the idea about how subtle 
the distinction between fact-based judgments and value judgments is, or between 
descriptive propositions and evaluative propositions, one cannot say that it has 
completely lost its meaning and usefulness. So much so that Greene, in order to 
avoid the naturalist fallacy denounced by Hume, recognizes that in case of moral 
disagreements due to inadequate natural mechanisms that compel us toward 
intragroup cooperation but not toward intergroup cooperation, a consensual solution must 
be found. Due to a lack of a “given” criterion, by nature or by God, and as a result 
of the unsatisfactory nature of the relativistic solution – in fact, non-solution –, as 
for a relativist any solution would have equal value43, that problem must be solved 
by a solution built by consensus, based on a common ground on which all agree. That 
foundation, for Greene, is the idea that one should maximize people’s happiness. 
But this does not avoid the naturalist fallacy. After all, why should we pursue or 
honor those moral sentiments, in particular cases, and for what reasons should we 
look for other solutions when they do not lead to altruism or cooperation as a 
result, or when there is conflict between the solutions such feelings dictate on 
different people? To answer this question, even if we manage to achieve 
“objectivity” in the study of moral issues, we will need to recognize that science is 
not merely descriptive, and that science should also provide solutions and 
improvements to the reality it describes. This requires a review of the positivist 
paradigm itself within Epistemology. 
Incidentally, regardless of the purposefulness of using a criterion to resolve 
moral conflicts, another intelligent way to minimize the flaws of “automatic mode” 
behavior that often lead to those conflicts is adopting the idea advocated by 
Amartya Sen according to which, in the contemporary world, we are all part of 
several different groups at the same time. This should be taken into account in 
order to achieve a non-violent solution to moral conflicts44. While in the distant 
past, our ancestors lived in small nomadic groups with individuals with whom they 
had to cooperate to survive, and rival groups which were almost always a source of 
danger, and were very rarely found, in the contemporary world one's individuality 
is determined by many different factors, and this places such an individual in the 
                    ___________________________                
Traduação de Laura Teixeira Mota. (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2013). 
42 SEN, Amartya. Desenvolvimento como liberdade. Tradução de Laura Teixeira Motta. (São Paulo: 
Companhia das Letras, 2000). 
43 So we could choose among them using a dice, as ironically says GREENE, Joshua. Moral Tribes. 
(New York: Penguin, 2013), 684. 
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most diverse groups at the same time. 
To use an example, let us imagine a teacher who is a Flamengo (soccer team) 
fan. He is an atheist, a liberal and the father of a child with visual impairment. 
When it comes to sports, his rival would be a Fluminense supporter. In a soccer 
match, at the Stadium, they would see each other as  “outsiders” if they rely only  
on their “automatic modes”. In other words, the automatic mode would not make 
the Flamengo  fan  inclined to cooperate  with the Fluminense supporter, if  their 
soccer rivalry is  the sole consideration. Indeed they would hate each other. If, 
however, both realize that they both have children with visual impairments, or that 
both defend liberal ideology, a certain empathy arising from their perceived 
identity in that other group could minimize or neutralize that rivalry. 
One way or another, those ideas clearly reveal that it is possible, even within a 
“descriptive” and “empirical” paradigm, to deal with ethical or moral issues and 
investigate their origin and foundations in order to find ways to use them in favor 
of a more fitting solution to moral issues that otherwise could be seen as insoluble 
or even impossible to be studied and discussed. Knowing how knowledge about 
such moral sentiments should be used, or which of those sentiments should be 
encouraged (altruism) and which should be minimized (hostility toward people 
seen as “different” or from “another group") certainly involves philosophical 
reflections, but we cannot simply state that moral sentiments are metaphysical and 
therefore impossible to be scientifically analyzed. 
We can see how thin  the line between fact-based judgments and value 
judgments is. Naturally, one may still work under this distinction. Some might 
argue, and not entirely without reason, that not all products of natural selection 
must be optimized and enhanced by men. After all, feelings such as aggressiveness 
also stem from that division, as do many other instincts and feelings that men 
often try to inhibit or minimize. If naturally selected moral sentiments give us the 
foundations of various “positive morals” that exist around the world, rational 
examination of those same sentiments, their goals and, considering such goals, 
their flaws, may enable us to develop a meta-morality that could help in  resolving 
conflicts between different moral systems. As noted above, this could be related to 
the maximization of individual freedoms. 
One might say, however, that the discussion here should not revolve around 
Morals, but Natural Law instead. The words “Moral” and “Natural Law”, 
nevertheless, can be used interchangeably, especially when we talk about an ideal 
paradigm based on which positive law can be assessed. The natural source of such 
moral sentiments - and of their insufficiency, which is to be addressed by a 
rationally grounded meta-morality that  resolves possible conflicts  - applies equally 
to the idea of natural law, which experiences one more rebirth. 
As for the above-mentioned mirror neurons which allow human beings to put 
themselves into someone else’s shoes, not only have they enabled moral 
sentiments and empathy, they, and the more sophisticated neurological structure 
that works with them in human beings, have also enabled institutional realities, 
that is, realities that only exist because they are inter-subjectively accepted45. From 
those realities arises culture, and  along with culture, arise notions such as money 
and law, which only exist because their existence is inter-subjectively accepted. 
In order to be recognized by those who submit to it, the   law, as a legal order, 
and its substance, must be close to what the people deem desirable. Obviously, a 
                    ___________________________ 
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complete coincidence is impossible, utopian and unattainable. Nonetheless, that 
does not mean that a possible approach should not be attempted. The greater the 
proximity, the greater the level of recognition of a legal order as such, and the 
greater  its distinction from the mere use of organized power. 
Within this context, freedom, equality and democracy appear as possible 
universal foundations upon which all legal systems should be organized, in order 
to meet, in its contents, the expectations of those who submit to  them46. This 
allows  “natural law”, which is inherent to mankind because of natural selection, to 
be a part, to a certain extent, of positive law propositions and to be corrected and 
improved toward a more effective legal system. 
We could say, to a certain extent, that those ideas also  arise in the “naturalistic 
fallacy”. After all, why would we want to build a more efficient and reputable legal 
system which is considered fairer by those who submit to it? As for the fact that 
the concept of justice is highly indeterminate, would this amount to disregard such 
pretensions? As a matter of fact, no. Doctors do not consider any less scientific,   
research that intends to discuss a swifter or painless surgical procedure, or that 
increases the patient’s welfare, regardless of the subjective nature of those ideas  
The same can be said of research designed to discover how to manufacture more 
economical and safer cars, or to find cheaper and less polluting sources of energy. 
If the Law is an institutional reality, measures that increase the recognition of its 
rules as an expression of the law, and not as a mere exercise of power, intend to 
make it better. In other words, that is the same ideal that inspires those involved in 
the study of other parts of reality. We obviously cannot confuse what the law is 
with what the law should be. In fact, the point is to describe it as it is understood 
while allowing for its improvement, in an attempt to make it closer to what it 
should be. Regardless of whether one is considering “positive moralities”, , i.e. 
moral rules that actually exists in every community, or “critical or ideal morality”, 
understood as a meta-criterion for judging several moral systems found in different 
societies, the possibility of disagreements should not cause the discussion to be 
abandoned, with respect to the values that should guide the evaluation and the 
improvement of reality as it is. The first reason is because we also find divergence 
and disagreement in sciences that are regarded as being more descriptive and 
objective, such as physics and biology. Setting aside unreasonable disagreements, 
like the ones that deny natural selection and claim that fossils are the record of 
animals that were unable to board Noah's Ark, there are founded disagreements 
that are currently insoluble, namely among theoretical physicists, and that surround 
key issues in the understanding of Universe. That disagreement is no reason for 
considering those topics as inferior, subjective or impossible to be debated47. 
Moral issues are not merely personal tastes; so much so that people give reasons to 
defend points of view regarding  moral issues (same sex marriage, abortion etc.), 
but refrain from doing the same in a “discussion” about the best ice cream flavor48. 
Moreover, the fact that there is disagreement on the optimal solution for certain 
problems does not mean that the same issue cannot be encountered in every kind 
of moral dilemma. Lack of consensus about what is perfect does not mean that it 
is not possible to solve situations for which there is consensus about its 
imperfection. In other words, eventually it is possible to reach consensus about the 
necessity of correcting something, although people cannot agree about what would 
                    ___________________________ 
46 MACHADO SEGUNDO, Hugo de Brito. Fundamentos do Direito. (São Paulo: Atlas, 2010), 87. 
47 ZIMMERMAN, Aaron. Moral epistemology. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 100; TERSMAN, Folke. 
Moral desagreement. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), xi. 
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be ideal49. Those issues can therefore be discussed openly, supported by empirical 
and experimental data, but, in one way or another, scientifically. 
Final considerations 
Moral sentiments currently appear to be less “metaphysical” than they seemed 
to be to scientists a few centuries or even decades ago, especially to social 
scientists. Without ignoring the fact that this statement may be subject to 
refutation, as any other statement that claims to be scientific, one can determine 
the origins, the purpose and even the failures of moral sentiments. 
Based on those notions, we may witness another revival of ideas related to 
“natural law”. This might open up new opportunities for discussion on the topic 
and its interaction with the development and interpretation of positive law. 
 Among those opportunities is the research about mechanisms to resolve 
conflicts arising from the contrast between different cultural and moral standards, 
one of the dilemmas of contemporary times. The best way to address such 
questions seems to be the one that maximizes freedom - and not exactly happiness 
- to the greatest number of people, under an enhanced perspective of 
utilitarianism. This option that is admittedly prescriptive; however this aspect on 
its own should not make us abandon the proposition. 
We are not defending the return to classical natural law or to an eternal and 
unchanging ideal of justice. Notwithstanding, such ideas allow us at the very least 
to consider moral judgments as something less abstract and subjective and enable 
rational discussions about them, their grounds and their possible relationships with 
positive law without the fear of being less “scientific”. 
This paper is not suggesting either that moral sentiments or any other instinct 
or automatic behavior shaped by natural selection should determine everything when 
it comes to human behavior. Strictly speaking, contemporary biology has shown 
that human beings are more “feral” than we used think, and that other animals 
have characteristics or traits that were previously imagined to be exclusively 
human. In fact, what happens is that the boundaries between humans and other 
animals are gradual and blurred, as is the case with virtually all separations we see 
in the phenomenal world. Of course there are human components that make us 
different. Those components allow for culture to emerge, and together with it 
differences in how those sentiments and instincts are implemented throughout 
time and space also occur. Just as there is a biological foundation for languages to 
emerge, with many different dialects, human beings have a natural inclination 
toward certain nutrients, which are, nevertheless, used to make different typical 




                    ___________________________ 
49 SEN, Amartya. The idea of justice. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009) 
2009, p. 104; LUKES, Steven. Moral relativism. (New York: Picador, 2008) 154. 
